Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by
a federal court of appeals opinion between January 31, 2007 and October
31, 2007. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then
by subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL LAW
Foreign Antisuit Injunctions – Level of International Comity
Deference: Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen
Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2007)

The 8th Circuit adopted the “conservative approach” for
determining the “level of deference afforded to international comity in
determining whether a foreign antisuit injunction should issue.” Id. at
359. The court joined the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and D.C. Circuits in holding
that “a foreign antisuit injunction will issue only if the movant
demonstrates that (1) an action in a foreign jurisdiction would prevent
United States jurisdiction or threaten a vital United States policy, and (2)
the domestic interests outweigh concerns of international comity.” Id.
The court rejected the “liberal approach” of the 5th and 9th Circuits
which “places only modest emphasis on international comity.” Id. at 360.
The court recognized that “world economic interdependence has
highlighted the importance of comity, as international commerce
depends to a large extent on ‘the ability of merchants to predict the likely
consequences of their conduct in overseas markets.’” Id. at 360–61.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that “the Congress and the President
possess greater experience with, knowledge of, and expertise in
international trade and economics than does the Judiciary.” Id. at 361.
Thus “the two other branches, not the Judiciary, bear the constitutional
duties related to foreign affairs.” Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Jury Selection – Delegation of Voir Dire to a Magistrate
Judge: United States v. Gonzalez, 483 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2007)

The 5th Circuit determined “the conditions under which jury
selection may be permissibly delegated to a magistrate judge.” Id. at 391.
The court noted that the 11th Circuit “appears to be alone in . . .
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[concluding] that the defendant’s personal consent is required for the
delegation of jury selection to be constitutionally valid.” Id. at 393. The
5th Circuit, agreeing with the 1st, 7th, 8th, and 9th circuits, reasoned that
a “defendant does not, by waiving his right to have an Article III judge
conduct voir dire, waive his right to judicial review of those proceedings.
Id. at 394. The court stated that the “nature of the right given up is
therefore limited, particularly as compared to the other rights that we
have held may be waived via counsel.” Id. In affirming the district
court’s judgment, the 5th Circuit held that “the right to have an Article
III judge conduct voir dire is one that may be waived through the consent
of counsel.” Id.
Prudential Standing – Conte Bros. Test: Phoenix of Broward,
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2007)

The 11th Circuit joined the 3rd and 5th Circuits in adopting the
Conte Bros. test for determining whether a party has prudential standing
to bring a false advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 1163. The 11th Circuit noted that the Conte Bros. test required the
court to “consider and weigh the following factors: (1) The nature of the
plaintiff’s alleged injury . . . ; (2) The directness or indirectness of the
asserted injury; (3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the
alleged injurious conduct; (4) The speculativeness of the damages claim;
and (5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning
damages.” Id. at 1163–64. The court concluded that this test “provides
appropriate flexibility in application to address factually disparate
scenarios that may arise in the future, while at the same time supplying a
principled means for addressing standing under . . . section 43(a).” Id. at
1164. This ruling conflicts with rulings in the 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits,
which have adopted a more categorical approach, holding that the
“plaintiff must be in ‘actual’ or ‘direct’ competition with the defendant
and assert a ‘competitive injury to establish prudential standing under
section 43(a).’” Id. The 1st and 2nd Circuits utilize a separate, third
approach, which asks “whether the plaintiff has a ‘reasonable interest’ to
be protected against the type of harm that the Lanham Act is intended to
prevent.” Id. at 1165.
Appellate Jurisdiction – Nonparty Rights to Appeal: Seymour
v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007)

The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 1st, 3rd, 10th and Federal
Circuits on the issue of whether a nonparty can appeal the rulings of a
district court. Id. at 929. The court noted the general rule that a nonparty
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cannot appeal the ruling of a district court unless the nonparty is
challenging a district court’s decision imposing sanctions on the attorney.
Id. The 7th Circuit’s holding limited appeals to monetary sanctions and
prevented appeals involving critical comments to fall within the
exception. Id. The court noted that its ruling created a split with other
circuit courts of appeals, but reasoned that adopting a different position
would result in a “breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction.” Id.
Relief from Judgment – Judicial Discretion Rule: Ford Motor
Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2007)

The 6th Circuit followed its own precedent by employing a judicial
discretion rule to determine whether a prior order of dismissal should be
set aside pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), when the
non-moving party breached a term of the consent judgment. Id. at 470.
The 6th Circuit precedent held that “a district court has a duty to vacate a
prior order of dismissal when required in the interests of justice, not
whenever a settlement agreement has been breached.” Id. at 470. The
court reaffirmed the “general rule that when considering a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion, the trial judge should use his discretion to determine if the
granting of such motion would further justice.” Id. This ruling is in
dispute with the 1st and 9th Circuits, which have held that “the material
breach of a settlement agreement which has been incorporated into the
judgment of a court entitles the nonbreaching party to relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).” Id. at 469.
Attorney’s Fees – Scope of Fed. R. App. P. 7 Regarding Costs
of Appeal: Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950
(9th Cir. 2007)

The 9th circuit analyzed “whether attorney’s fees are ‘costs on
appeal’ securable under [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure] 7.” Id. at
954. The court noted that the issue was one of first impression, and that
“[s]ix other circuits [were] split on the question.” Id. at 955.
After assessing the reasoning of the various circuits, the 9th Circuit
concluded that it sided with the “majority rule” adopted by the 2nd, 6th,
and 11th Circuits. Id. The court thus held “that the term ‘costs on appeal’
in Rule 7 includes all expenses defined as ‘costs’ by an applicable feeshifting statute, including attorney’s fees.” Id. at 958. The court
articulated four reasons for its agreement with the rule. First, the court
stated that “Rule 7 does not define ‘costs on appeal.’” Id. Second, the
court explained that “Rule 39 [regarding recoverability of costs] does not
contain any ‘expression[ ] to the contrary.’” Id. Third, although the court
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noted some criticism of the rule, it ultimately agreed that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of “costs” in Marek v. Chesny “counsels that
[courts] must take feeshifting statutes at their word.” Id. at 959. Fourth,
the court reasoned that “allowing district courts to include appellate
attorney’s fees in estimating and ordering security for statutorily
authorized costs under Rule 7 comports with their role in taxing the full
range of costs of appeal.” Id.
IMMIGRATION
Board of Immigration Appeals Authority – Motion to
Reopen: Chhetry v. United States DOJ, 490 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.
2007)

The 2nd Circuit found that the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) exceeded its authority when it denied the plaintiff’s motion to
reopen the denial of asylum status based on inferences it drew from news
articles “without giving him the opportunity to rebut the significance of
the noticed facts as applied to his particular situation.” Id. at 200. The
court followed the 9th and 10th Circuits by concluding that the
“availability of a motion to reopen is an inadequate substitute for a full
opportunity to rebut administratively noticed facts.” Id. at 201. The 2nd
Circuit reasoned that “the discretionary nature of motions to reopen does
not guarantee a petitioner an effective ability to respond to previouslynoticed facts, and petitioners are not guaranteed a stay of deportation
while awaiting a decision on reopening.” Id. This ruling is in dispute
with the findings of the 5th, 7th, and D.C. Circuits, which have found
that the “availability of a motion to reopen serves as a sufficient
mechanism to rebut officially noticed facts.” Id.
“Refugee” Asylum – IIRIRA: Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494
F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007)

The 2nd Circuit held that section 601(a) of the Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) “does not extend
automatic refugee status to spouses or unmarried partners of individuals
section 601(a) expressly protects.” Id. at 300. This decision created a
circuit split with the 5th, 7th, and 9th circuits, which have deferred to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision from Matter of C-Y-Z-.
Id. at 299. The BIA held “that an individual whose spouse has been
forced to abort a pregnancy, undergone involuntary sterilization, or been
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persecuted under a coercive population control program could
automatically qualify for asylum as a ‘refugee’ . . . .” Id. The court
further noted that the 3rd Circuit “had questioned the BIA’s reading of
the plain language of the amendment . . . [however] a divided panel of
the 3rd Circuit recently validated the BIA’s interpretation of section
601(a) over a vigorous dissent.” Id. The court concluded that “the BIA
erred in its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) by failing to
acknowledge language in section 601(a), viewed in the context of the
statutory scheme governing entitlement to asylum, that is unambiguous
and that does not extend automatic refugee status to spouses or
unmarried partners that section 601(a) expressly protects.” Id. at 300.
Removal Proceedings – Grounds for Removability: DulalWhiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116 (2nd Cir.
2007)

The 2nd Circuit addressed the question of “whether the information
in a restitution order may establish that an alien’s conviction was for a
removable offense.” Id. at 130. The 2nd Circuit held that “the BIA
[Board of Immigration Appeals], in determining whether an alien is
removable based on a conviction for an offense set forth in the INA
[Immigration and Nationality Act], may rely only upon information
appearing in the record of conviction that would be permissible under the
Taylor-Shepard approach in the sentencing context.” Id. at 131. The 2nd
Circuit’s decision contradicted the 1st Circuit’s decision in Conteh v.
Gonzalez, in which the 1st Circuit rejected the categorical approach,
arguing that it “impermissibly elevates the government’s burden in civil
removal proceedings,” and “conclud[ing] that the alien’s restitution order
. . . permitted [the court] to conclude that the alien’s conviction was for
removable conduct.” Id.
However, both the 9th and 11th Circuits have agreed with the 2nd
Circuit’s holding on this issue. Id. at 133. The 2nd Circuit noted that the
9th Circuit held “removability could be established only by facts of
which the alien was convicted,” and the 11th Circuit found that “the
restitution amount . . . could not, standing alone, establish removability
by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” Id.
Immigration and Nationality Act – Jurisdictional Bar to
Judicial Review: Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2007)

The 7th Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review an
immigration judge’s denial of a continuance in a removal proceeding
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality
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Act (“INA”). Id. at 660. The court began by noting that section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of any decision or action for
which the authority “is specified under this subchapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General.” Id. The 7th Circuit disagreed with
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits, and also with the Attorney
General’s contention that because immigration judges were granted
authority to issue continuances by the regulations rather than the statute,
the “jurisdiction-stripping provision” did not apply. Id. at 660–61. While
recognizing that its interpretation was the minority position among
circuit courts considering the issue, the 7th Circuit emphasized that the
immigration judge’s authority to rule on a continuance was statutory; the
regulations merely implemented the authority already conferred upon the
judge. Id. at 663. The court explained that immigration judges derived
authority to conduct removal proceedings from 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a),
which was part of the subchapter specified in the relevant jurisdictionstripping provision. Id. With such authority, the immigration judge’s
denial of a continuance motion was an unreviewable discretionary
decision or action. Id. at 660–61. In explaining its agreement with the 8th
and 10th Circuits, the 7th Circuit noted that it was bound by its recent
decision in Leguizamo-Medina v. Gonzales. Id. at 663–64. Following its
holding in Leguizamo-Medina, which dealt with the subsection of the
INA immediately preceding the provision at issue in the instant case, the
7th Circuit concluded that since the continuance motion was a
“procedural step along the way to an unreviewable final decision,” the
denial of the continuance was therefore also unreviewable under section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the INA. Id. at 664.
Immigration Board – Corroboration Rule: Oyekunle v.
Gonzales, 498 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007)

The 7th Circuit noted the split among the circuit courts regarding
the validity of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
“corroboration rule,” which “empowers the immigration judge to require
that credible testimony of the asylum seeker be corroborated in
circumstances in which one would expect corroborating evidence to be
available and presented in the immigration hearing.” Id. at 717. The court
expressed skepticism about the rule, recognizing that the 9th Circuit had
found the rule invalid due to “the oddity of requiring corroboration of
testimony that the immigration judge has already decided to credit.” Id.
The court noted that although the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits had all
applied the rule, only the 2nd Circuit actually considered its validity. Id.
The court recognized that “[f]or aliens who applied for asylum after May
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11, 2005 . . . the rule has been superseded by a statute” that “in effect
codifies the rule,” however, in this case “the petitioner applied for
asylum earlier than that, so the statute doesn’t apply to her.” Id. at 717–
18. The court ultimately found the rule inapplicable and also noted that
contrary to the BIA’s determination, the corroborative evidence in the
case supported the [petitioner] having a “well-founded fear of
persecution if she is returned to Nigeria.” Id. at 718.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Mail Fraud Statutes – Salary Theory: United States v. Ratcliff,
488 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2007)

The 5th Circuit adhered strictly to the plain language of the statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1341, in refusing to adopt the “salary theory” employed by
the 1st, 2nd and 8th Circuits. Id. at 646. The court noted that under the
mail fraud statute, “the indictment must allege that the defendant devised
or intended to devise a scheme to defraud including a scheme for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.” Id. at 643–44. The 5th Circuit interpreted
the statutory language as unambiguous and refused to adopt the
alternative “salary method” offered by the government. Id. at 646. The
court held that although its sister circuits embraced the “salary theory”
for charges of mail fraud in election cases, “none of these cases
contain[ed] any reasoning relevant to the issues presented in this appeal .
. . .” Id. at 647. Therefore, the court refused to expand the meaning of the
mail fraud statute to encompass the “salary theory” offered by the
government “because it invites . . . a sweeping expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress.” Id.
at 648.
DNA Statutes – Totality of the Circumstances Test: Banks v.
United States, 490 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2007)

The 10th Circuit recognized divergent approaches among the circuit
courts when analyzing DNA-indexing statutes to determine “whether the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, as amended, passe[d]
constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1183. The
court joined the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits in
applying a “reasonableness test informed by the totality of the
circumstances,” and rejected the “special-needs analysis” of the 2nd and
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7th Circuits. Id. at 1182–83. The court examined the divide in the 10th
Circuit’s own precedent, noting that “[i]n three successive opinions, this
[c]ourt applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to substantially similar
DNA-indexing statutes,” but later broke from precedent in United States
v. Kimler, and “upheld a federal DNA statute under a special-needs test.”
Id. at 1183–84. The court criticized the break from precedent,
recognizing that “Kimler neither explained why building a DNA
database is a special need, nor applied a balancing test to determine
whether this special need outweighed the defendant’s right to privacy.”
Id. at 1184. The court explained that although it chose to apply the
“totality-of-the-circumstances test” in the instant case, the decision did
“not eliminate the possibility that the Act satisfies the special-needs test”
as well. Id.
RICO – Application to Violent but Noneconomic Criminal
Activity: United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.
2007)

The 1st Circuit addressed the application of the “Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962,
to a street gang engaged in violent, but noneconomic, criminal activity.”
Id. at 29–30. The court noted that the issue involved weighty
constitutional implications that led the 6th Circuit to hold that “the RICO
statute reaches an enterprise engaged in noneconomic violent crime only
if the enterprise’s activities have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 38.
The 1st Circuit adopted a contradictory view by holding that “the
normal requirements of the RICO statute apply to defendants involved
with enterprises that are engaged only in noneconomic criminal activity.”
Id. at 30. The court indicated that the RICO statute applied to any
“enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.” Id. at 37. The court explained that “[t]here is nothing
in either the statutory language or the legislative history that supports the
. . . contention that these words mean different things as applied to
different types of enterprises.” Id. at 37. Furthermore, the 1st Circuit
rejected the 6th Circuit’s holding by noting “[t]he absence of anything in
the reasoning of that court that explains how it is possible, consistent
with sound canons of statutory construction, to read the word “affect” as
possessing two different meanings depending upon additional facts not
mentioned in the statute itself, makes the decision suspect.” Id. at 38.
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Armed Career Criminals Act – Prison Escape as Violent
Felony: United States v. Collier, 493 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2007)

The 6th Circuit considered whether a prison escape constituted a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”). Id. at
734. The court determined that a prison escape was not a “violent
felony” under the ACCA, where “a state has defined escape as complete
when the defendant leaves custody without hav[ing] been discharged.”
Id. at 736. The court explained that it would be “inappropriate to
speculate about the circumstances of the defendant’s ultimate
apprehension because that conduct [in such a circumstance] is simply not
part of the offense.” Id. The 6th Circuit concluded that “failure to report
escape in a jurisdiction . . . that defines escape as complete upon leaving
custody without having been discharged is not categorically a violent
felony.” Id. at 737. The court agreed with the 7th, 9th, 10th, and D.C.
Circuits in formulating its decision. Id. at 755. However, the 6th Circuit
recognized that the 1st, 3rd, and 8th Circuits previously held that any
escape from custody could be considered categorically violent. Id.
ERISA – Remand Orders as Appealable Final Decisions:
Giraldo v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 502 F.3d 200 (2d
Cir. 2007)

The 2nd Circuit determined whether a remand order to a plan
administrator of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) constituted an appealable “final decision” under 29 U.S.C. §
1291. Id. at 202. The court noted that the 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits
barred all such appeals, while the 7th and 9th Circuits allowed these
appeals in certain circumstances. Id. The 2nd Circuit concluded that the
district court’s remand only sought further development of the factual
record without any judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
defendant’s decision. Id. at 202–03. Failing to meet the circumstances
outlined by the 7th and 9th Circuits, the 2nd Circuit held that the remand
was not an appealable “final judgment” under section 1291 of ERISA.
Id. at 203.
ERISA – Necessity of Establishing Reliance or Prejudice:
Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453 (5th Cir.
2007)

The 5th Circuit addressed whether an ERISA claimant needed to
establish reliance and/or prejudice based on the conflicting terms of a
Summary Plan Description (“SPD”). Id. at 457–58. The court recognized
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that a five-way circuit split surrounded the issue. Id. Specifically, the
court noted that, “[t]he 3rd and 6th Circuits do not require a showing of
reliance; the 2nd Circuit also does not require a showing of reliance, but
does require a showing of a likelihood of prejudice, which an employer
may then rebut through evidence that the deficient SPD was in effect a
harmless error.” Id. The court continued by acknowledging that the “7th
and 11th Circuits require a showing of reliance while the 1st, 4th, and
10th Circuits require a showing of reliance or prejudice, though it
appears that the terms ‘reliance’ and ‘prejudice’ are sometimes treated
synonymously.” Id. The 5th Circuit also noted that “the 8th Circuit
requires a showing of reliance or prejudice, but only if the SPD is
‘faulty.’” Id.
After assessing the different approaches by other circuits, the 5th
Circuit endorsed the view of the 3rd Circuit, basing its holding on
contract law to find “that an ERISA claimant need not show reliance or
prejudice when the terms of a [Summary Plan Description] conflict with
the plan itself.” Id. Moreover, the court reasoned that its holding was
“most consistent with ERISA, which is designed to protect employees;
and most consistent with” the court’s opinion in Hansen v. Continental
Ins. Co., “which refused to place the burden of conflicting SPDs on plan
beneficiaries.” Id. at 459.
ERISA – Collateral Order Doctrine: Graham v. Hartford Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2007)

The 10th Circuit noted that the circuit courts varied on how they
approached the issue of “finality in cases involving ERISA remand
orders.” Id. at 1159. The court indicated that “[t]he majority of circuits
have relied on one of the analogues invoked in Rekstad or the collateral
order doctrine in deciding whether a decision to remand a benefits
decision to a plan administrator is final.” Id. The court acknowledged
that the 1st, 6th, 9th, 10th (itself), and 11th Circuits held that “an order
remanding to an ERISA plan administrator for further proceedings is
interlocutory in nature and therefore not immediately appealable,
particularly when the district court retained jurisdiction or otherwise
deferred considering the merits of the administrator’s decision being
reviewed.” Id. at 1160. The 10th Circuit explained that the 6th Circuit
found such a decision not final and not appealable, because “assessment
of damages or awarding of other relief remain[ed] to be resolved.” Id. at
20. However, the court also noted that the 7th Circuit held the same type
of decision as final and appealable. Id.
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The 6th Circuit indicated that its approach to the issue would vary
on “a case-by-case basis applying well-settled principles governing ‘final
decisions.’” Id. at 1157. Citing Rekstag, the court compared the remand
in that case to a summary judgment on an ERISA claim with unresolved
damages, or a remand to an agency, both of which were not appealable.
Id. However, the court also carved out an exception for urgent and
important issues, holding that the “practical finality rule may be invoked
when the lack of immediate review of an order for an administrative
remand would violate basic judicial principles.” Id. The court further
explained that it looked at substance rather than form when making its
case-by-case determination whether an order to remand was final. Id. at
1161.
IDEA – Congressional Intent: Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist.,
504 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2007)

The 9th Circuit considered whether Congress intended rights under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) to be
enforceable under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Id. at 773–74. The court noted that
the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 10th Circuits have held that Congress did not intend
IDEA rights to be enforced under the statute, while the 2nd and 7th
Circuits found that Congress did so intend. Id. at 773–74. The court also
recognized that the 8th Circuit has issued rulings both ways. Id. at 774.
The court agreed with the 3rd Circuit’s ruling in A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.
Sch., where that court indicated that “[t]he IDEA includes a judicial
remedy for violations of any right ‘relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of [a] child, or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to such child,’” and that “[g]iven this
comprehensive scheme, Congress did not intend section 1983 to be
available to remedy violations of the IDEA . . . .” Id. The 9th Circuit
concluded that “the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA
evidences Congress’ intent to preclude a section 1983 claim for the
violation of rights under the IDEA.” Id. at 774–75.
Federal Tort Claims Act – Interpretation of “Other Law
Enforcement Officer” Exception: ABC v. DEF, 500 F.3d 103
(2d Cir. 2007)

The 2nd Circuit followed “a sound minority of the courts of appeals
and conclude[d] that the phrase ‘other law enforcement officer’ in [28
U.S.C.S.] § 2680(c) references only law enforcement officers whose
function or authority are related to customs or excise functions” when it
interpreted one of the exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act which
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“bars jurisdiction for claims involving the detention of goods ‘by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.’” Id. at
105, 107. The court noted that the Federal, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits have adopted a broad reading of the exception while the D.C.,
4th, 6th, and 7th Circuits employed a narrow reading. Id. The 2nd Circuit
ruled that because the prisoner’s claim that “a prison officer negligently
detained and lost his property during his transfer from one cell to
another” was not barred by section 2680(c), the district court’s dismissal
of the prisoner’s claim was vacated and the case was remanded for
further proceedings. Id. at 105.
Bankruptcy Law – Nondischarge of Individual Debts: Denton
v. Hyman, 502 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007)

The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether a ‘defalcation’ under [11
U.S.C.S.] § 523(a)(4) includes all misappropriations or failures to
account or only those that evince some wrong conduct.” Id. at 66. The
court recognized that the 4th, 8th, and 9th Circuits took the most lenient
approach to hold “that an innocent mistake can constitute a defalcation.”
Id. at 67. However, the court noted that a “majority of Circuits
addressing this issue require[d] some level of wrongful conduct in order
to find a defalcation under section 523(a)(4). The 5th, 6th, and 7th
Circuits require a level of fault greater than mere negligence.” Id. at 68.
In addition, the 2nd Circuit commented that the 10th circuit’s standard
remained ambiguous, “but at least require[d] ‘some portion of
misconduct.’” Id. at 68. The 2nd Circuit adopted the 1st Circuit’s
stringent standard, “holding that defalcation under section 523(a)(4)
requires a showing of conscious misbehavior or extreme recklessness—a
showing akin to the level of recklessness required for scienter in the
securities law context.” Id. The 2nd Circuit listed three justifications for
this “extreme recklessness” standard: it “ensures that the term
‘defalcation’ complements but does not dilute the other terms of the
provision . . . all of which require a showing of actual wrongful intent”; it
“insures that the harsh sanction of non-dischargeability is reserved for
those who exhibit ‘some portion of misconduct’”; and it “has the virtue
of ease of application since the courts and litigants have reference to a
robust body of securities law.” Id. at 68–69.
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL LAW
Fourth Amendment – Investigatory Stops upon Reason of
Completed Misdemeanor: United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d
1135 (10th Cir. 2007)

The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Supreme Court
holding in United States v. Hensley, “that the Fourth Amendment permits
police officers to conduct an investigatory stop if they have a ‘reasonable
suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they
encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed
felony,’” extends to misdemeanors. Id. at 10–11. The court noted that a
split existed between the 6th Circuit, which held that “[p]olice may . . .
make a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony,
though not of a mere completed misdemeanor[,]” and the 9th Circuit,
which ruled that “in reviewing the reasonableness of a stop to investigate
a completed misdemeanor, a court must consider the nature of the
misdemeanor offense in question, with particular attention to the
potential for ongoing or repeated danger . . . and any risk of escalation.”
Id. at 1140–41. The court applied the Supreme Court’s approach in
Hensley and “determine[d] the constitutionality of an investigatory stop
by balancing ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.’” Id. at 1141. After its analysis, the 10th Circuit concluded that
“the officers’ investigatory stop . . . was reasonable in light of the
particular facts and circumstances of this case.” Id.
Habeas – Favorable-Termination Requirement for 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Claimants: Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender
Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007)

The 6th Circuit adhered strictly to Supreme Court Justice Souter’s
analysis in Heck v. Humphrey and Spencer v. Kemna to adopt his view
that the favorable-termination requirement “does not preclude [42
U.S.C.S.] § 1983 lawsuits by persons who could not have their
convictions or sentences impugned through habeas review.” Id. at 600,
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602. The court noted a “distinct split of authority among the Federal
Circuit Courts on this issue,” explaining that the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 8th
Circuits rejected Justice Souter’s analysis to instead hold that “section
1983 claimants must comply with Heck’s favorable-termination
requirement even if habeas relief was unavailable to them.” Id. at 602.
Thus, the 6th Circuit agreed with the “logic of the United States Courts
of Appeals for the 2nd, 9th, and 11th Circuits which have held that
Heck’s favorable-termination requirement cannot be imposed against
section 1983 plaintiffs who lack a habeas option for the vindication of
their federal rights.” Id. at 603.
Fourth Amendment – DNA Profiling of Felons: United States
v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007)

The 1st Circuit employed a totality of the circumstances approach
to hold that cataloguing the DNA from a felon on supervised release did
not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 15. The court noted that use of
the totality of the circumstances test to judge criminal DNA cataloguing
laws was the majority position among the circuits, with only the 2nd, 7th,
and 10th Circuits applying the special needs test. Id. at 18–19. The court
explained that most of the circuit decisions predated the Supreme Court
decision in Samson v. California, where the totality of the circumstances
test was applied to a search of a parolee absent suspicion. Id. at 8–9. The
1st Circuit noted that the circuit courts had never distinguished between
supervised release, probation, and parole in the context of Fourth
Amendment analysis before. Id. at 11. The court then rejected a
distinction drawn by a 2007 decision of the 2nd Circuit that applied the
special needs test after finding Samson only applied to parolees, not
probationers. Id.
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute – Preemption: United
States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2007)

The 11th Circuit construed the substitute property provision of the
federal criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), as preempting the
homestead exception under Florida’s Constitution and tenancy by the
entireties law. Id. at 1232. The court noted that the federal criminal
forfeiture statute authorized the government to seize property “involved”
or “traceable” to a crime specified within the statute. Id. at 1226. The
court also indicated that, under section 853(p), the government could
seize substitute property in the event that traceable property was
unavailable. Id. However, the court recognized that the provision
contradicted Florida state law protecting marital assets from forfeiture.
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Id. at 1227. Ultimately, the 11th Circuit concluded that the explicit
language contained within the statute provided no exception for property
protected from forfeiture under state law, and that the Federal law
preempted the state law. Id. The court’s decision created a split with a
7th Circuit case that deferred to state law. Id. at 1231.
Immunity – Police Officer’s Qualified Immunity: Callahan v.
Millard County, 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007)

The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of whether individual police
officers were entitled to “qualified immunity derived from the “consentonce-removed” doctrine.” Id. at 894. The court held that where an
individual’s constitutional rights were clearly established and violated,
individual police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
899. The court recognized that “the “consent-once-removed doctrine”
applied when an undercover officer entered a house at the express
invitation of someone with authority to consent, established probable
cause to arrest or search, and then immediately summoned other officers
for assistance. Id. at 896. However, the court disagreed with holdings
from the 6th and 7th Circuits that extended the “consent-once-removed”
doctrine to confidential informants. Id. The court determined that there
was a significant difference “between an officer and an informant
summoning additional officers” to a home to conduct a search. Id. The
10th Circuit noted that “the invitation of an informant into a house who
then in turn invites the police . . . would require an expansion of the
consent exception.” Id. at 897. The court concluded that where police
officers entered into a “home based on the invitation of an informant and
without a warrant, direct consent, or other exigent circumstances,” the
Fourth Amendment rights of the homeowner had been constitutionally
violated. Id. at 898.
SENTENCING
Child Pornography – Sentence Enhancements: United States
v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2007)

The 10th Circuit determined whether sentences for attempted
interstate transportation of child pornography and possession of child
pornography were properly enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B),
which enhanced an offense when it involved “distribution for the receipt,
or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.”
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Id. at 1106. Specifically, the 10th Circuit determined that a broad reading
of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) was not proper and that by sharing files on
a file-sharing network, a defendant did not necessarily expect to receive a
“thing of value.” Id. at 1111. This determination was contrary to the 8th
Circuit’s finding that, when a defendant downloads and shares child
pornography over a file-sharing network, he was presumed to do so with
an expectation of receiving a “thing of value.” Id.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Appointment of Defense Counsel – Presumed Prejudice in
Capital Offense Cases: United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313
(5th Cir. 2007)

The 5th Circuit recognized a circuit split between the 3rd and 4th
Circuits on whether “failure to appoint second counsel under [18 U.S.C.
§ 3005] gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.” Id. at
348. The court noted that section 3005 provided “that those charged with
federal capital offenses are entitled to two lawyers, one of whom ‘shall
be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.’” Id. at 347. The court
recognized that in the instant case, the defendant cited several 4th Circuit
cases advocating a “presumed-prejudice approach” to support his claim
that the district court erred because it “fail[ed] to consult the FPD
[Federal Public Defender] before appointing capital counsel.” Id. at 348.
The court indicated, however, that the cases cited were distinguishable in
that they “all involve[d] district courts’ failures to appoint any second
counsel.” Id. The 5th Circuit also acknowledged the view of the 3rd
Circuit, which “explicitly rejected the [4th] Circuit’s presumed-prejudice
approach to a court’s failure to appoint second counsel.” Id. Ultimately,
the court “decline[d] to extend the [4th] Circuit’s approach,” and held
that, “fail[ure] to consult the FPD before appointing capital counsel” did
not result in a structural error or presumed prejudice. Id.
Aiding and Abetting – Knowledge of Prior Conviction:
United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2007)

The 6th Circuit concurred with 3rd Circuit precedent, holding that
an aiding and abetting conviction under the felon in-possession statute
[18 U.S.C. § 922(g)] could only stand if the government presented proof
that the defendant knew or had “reasonable cause to know that the
principal is a felon . . . .” Id. at 714. Rejecting the 9th Circuit’s
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requirement that “the government need not show that the defendant knew
the principal was a felon,” as well as the 7th Circuit’s requirement that
the defendant only “share the principal’s knowledge that the principal
possessed a gun,” the court agreed with the 3rd Circuit that “to allow
aider-and-abettor liability without requiring proof of knowledge of the
status of the principal . . . would effectively circumvent the knowledge
element . . . and would thus abrogate congressional intent.” Id. at 714–
15. Specifically, the 6th Circuit found that allowing a conviction for
aiding and abetting to stand without knowledge of the principal’s felony
status would effectively negate the knowledge element written into
section 922(d) (sale to a felon). Id. at 715.

